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The government’s extensive programme for stimulating the economy has enabled China to 
maintain high economic growth after the global financial crisis in 2008. However, this success 
has come at the price of a number of negative economic phenomena and the consequences 
they have had are the major challenge for the government today. The vast programme of 
investments in infrastructure, construction and fixed assets, which has been the main source 
of economic growth over the past few years, has caused a rapid increase in China’s debt from 
158% of GDP in 2007 to 282% in 2014. Along with the local governments in charge of imple-
menting the programme, the Chinese sector of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been he-
avily burdened by the stimulation policy. The sector’s profitability has fallen, its indebtedness 
has increased and management problems have been revealed. 
The ‘mixed ownership reform’ put forward by the new Xi Jinping government was expected to 
respond to these challenges, including by improving the financial condition of the SOEs sector 
through restructuring and the sale of minority stakes in companies. To implement this plan, 
with private investors playing a more active role, the Chinese leadership needed well-developed 
markets with sufficient depth. This is one of the reasons why the government launched the 
campaign promoting investments on the stock exchange which gave rise to the boom on the 
Chinese stock market in the middle of 2014 which ended one year later with a series of price 
falls and the imposition of strict administrative supervision over the Chinese stock exchanges. 
The government’s engagement along with the low level of development of the Chinese cap-
ital markets and the shortcomings in their regulations have made investor sentiment depen-
dent on watching the government’s moves and has led to short-term speculation strategies 
becoming predominant. At present, price fluctuation on the stock markets depends on the 
government’s moves and not on the fundamental economic factors. One way out of this 
situation is to extend the reform of the capital markets – until that time the restructuring of 
the SOEs by means of the sale of minority stakes will remain restricted. Even the large finan-
cial reserves which give the Chinese government time to implement the reforms are limited 
– given this context, 2016 appears to be a key year from the point of view of the Chinese re-
form programme and of ensuring sustainable economic development. 
The debt of state-owned enterprises
The brunt of the stimulation package launched 
by Beijing after 2008 has been borne by the 
Chinese provincial governments. Since GDP 
growth was at that time the main local lead-
ers’ evaluation criterion for the evaluation of 
local leaders, they embarked upon an extensive 
programme to stimulate the economy, signifi-
cantly increasing the expenditure on transport 
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infrastructure, construction and fixed assets. 
Since the official debt limits were imposed on 
local governments in 1994, extra-budgetary 
mechanisms have been employed to increase 
stimulus spending1, in particular, investments 
in companies controlled by local governments 
and creating so-called ‘local government fi-
nancing vehicles’ (LGFV)2, to attract addition-
al capital. Political reasons determined that 
the expenditure of SOEs managed by the cen-
tral government have also been increased3. 
The Chinese SOE sector’s extraordinary expen-
diture on stimulating the economy was financed 
massive credit growth. Shortly before the crisis, 
in 2007, the debt-to-equity ratio in SOEs was 
around 140%, while by 2013 this ratio rose to 
around 200%4. According to McKinsey Global 
Institute, between 2007 and 2014, China’s debt-
to-GDP ratio rose from 158% to 282%, and debts 
in the companies sector increased from around 
US$3.4 trillion to US$12 trillion, reaching 125% 
of the country’s GDP. Experts from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences point out that if the 
1 According to the IMF, had this category of expenditure 
been taken into account in calculating the deficit in the 
Chinese central budget, it would have reached 15% in 2009 
(officially, it was 2.8%), and 10% in 2012 (officially 1.5%). 
2 The LGFV are viewed as being the ‘ticking time bomb’ of 
the Chinese financial system, where high-interest debts 
are estimated to be around US$3.8 trillion. In 2015, the 
central government began restructuring the debt by re-
placing the loans they had taken with long-term bonds, 
with state-owned banks being engaged in the task. 
3 About one third of the approximately 150,000 Chinese 
state-owned companies are subsidiaries of around 100 
conglomerates controlled by the central government 
(according to estimates from Deutsche Bank). The re-
mainder are owned by local governments on the provin-
cial and municipal level. 
4 In the private sector this ratio fell within this timeframe 
from around 140% to around 115%. 
present debt growth rate is maintained, in 2020 
this ratio may reach as much as 200% of GDP. 
As a consequence of the government’s pressure 
to stimulate short-term growth, funds obtained 
through increasing debts were often allocated 
to low-quality investment projects, sometimes 
disregarding economic feasibility. Investments 
in developing production capacity have led to 
significant overcapacity in some sectors, and 
the spending on infrastructure has also de-
layed returns on investments, thus undermin-
ing the financial stability of SOEs and adverse-
ly affecting their profitability5. Due to the fact 
that China’s GDP growth is slowing down as 
a result of restructuring the economy and the 
slower development of the construction sector, 
some SOEs that have become less profitable 
(in particular those linked to the primary and 
construction sectors) are facing insolvency. As 
a consequence of the lack of political approval 
for the liquidation of unprofitable companies, 
a number of companies have turned into so-
called ‘zombie firms’, surviving only owing to 
their growing debts. 
The so-called ‘mixed ownership reform’ (混合
所有制改) announced in November 2013 by the 
main planning authority, the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission, was intended to 
serve as a remedy for the dramatic deteriora-
tion of the financial condition of Chinese SOEs. 
It was expected to enhance the role of market 
forces through the sale of part of their assets to 
private investors, while leaving the controlling 
stakes in these companies in the hands of the 
state. Mixed ownership is expected to improve 
the quality of corporate governance and man-
agement efficiency, without depriving the 
state of its role of key economic actor. Other 
essential elements include the concentration 
of state capital in strategic sectors and those 
5 In 2007, the profitability ratio of assets in the industrial 
sector remained on a similar level for both state-owned 
and private companies – 7% and 8% respectively. In 
2013, the ratio for state-owned companies was only 
4.5%, less than half the ratio for private firms. 
China’s economic growth after 2007 has 
been to a great extent based on a mas-
sive increase in credit made available to 
state-owned enterprises and local gov-
ernments.
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which provide services to the population, as 
well as restructuring and ownership concen-
tration in professionally managed holdings. 
Ultimately, the state intends to withdraw from 
the most competitive markets, such as the re-
tail trade, the hospitality industry, and the con-
struction and low-end manufacturing sectors. 
Around 60% of SOEs operate in these sectors. 
The sale of part of the assets on the scale an-
nounced by the government was expected to 
bring significant funds to SOEs, offering the 
opportunity to improve the sector’s financial 
situation and reduce its debts. This would also 
mean lifting a great deal of the burden off the 
local governments (which control the majority 
of SOEs)6. Towards the end of 2014, twenty Chi-
nese provinces presented their plans to imple-
ment the reform7. It is estimated that local gov-
ernments’ assets in non-strategic sectors alone 
(these are scheduled to be sold off first) might 
be worth as much as US$7 trillion8. 
The government is playing  
with the market
The mixed ownership reform envisaged several 
methods of selling of the assets of SOEs, includ-
ing sharing the infrastructure costs as part of 
a public-private partnership, selling shares to in-
6 Even though local governments control most state-
owned companies, the companies generate only around 
40% of total public sector revenue (2015). 
7 For example, the government of Guangdong Province 
has declared that 80% of state-owned companies would 
be open to private capital by 2020.
8 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-05/
china-provinces-eye-sales-from-7-trillion-asset-holdings
stitutional investors and management buyouts. 
However, the existence of a deep and liquid 
stock market is key to ensuring sufficiently ex-
tensive financing for SOEs, and will simultane-
ously open up the way to slowing down the pro-
cess of them falling into debt. Additional share 
issues or new initial public offerings (IPOs) of 
SOEs offer access to a large group of local and 
foreign institutional and individual investors, 
with controlling stakes remaining in the hands 
of state-owned holdings. The attractiveness of 
this model of financing is also affected by the 
unwillingness of some private entrepreneurs9 
to acquire shares in SOEs without being offered 
any influence on their business decisions, and 
also due to the very high corruption poten-
tial in the case of management buyouts. The 
government’s stance on the stock market was 
discussed in an article entitled ‘Capital markets 
will be at the forefront of the mixed ownership 
reform’10 published in September 2014 in the 
main economic newspaper of the Communist 
Party of China, Jingji Ribao. The article stated 
that the stock exchange was an ideal platform 
for implementing the reform, and the pros-
pect of a large number of SOEs being listed 
on the stock markets was presented as being 
a catalyst for it to develop.
In the middle of 2015, the public sector restruc-
turing seemed to enter the decisive phase. Pilot 
projects allocated by the SASAC, the agency 
managing SOEs, were in the final phase. Large 
state-owned holdings, such as the oil company 
SINOPEC and the financial giant CITIC, began 
shifting part of their assets to companies listed 
on the Hong Kong stock exchange. In June 2015, 
the CNNC, one of the two giants on the nuclear 
energy sector, was floated on the Shanghai stock 
exchange. The state-owned Merchants Bank of 
China launched an additional issue of shares. 
9 For example, Wang Jianlin, the owner of Wanda Group, 
one of China’s largest private conglomerates, has ex-
pressed a similar opinion. 
10 http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86302/n86361/n86396/
c1595595/content.html 
Opening up to market incentives and of-
fering a level of ownership to private 
investors is intended to improve man-
agement quality and the performance of 
state-owned enterprises.
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On 16 June 2015, the Shanghai stock exchange 
saw the largest initial public offering of shares 
(IPO) since 2010 – Guotai Junan Securities Co, 
China’s largest state-owned broker in terms of 
revenue, attracted the equivalent of US$ 4.8 bil-
lion. According to some estimates, SOEs attract-
ed around US$100 billion during the boom11.
The key role played by the stock exchange in 
the SOE reform process needs to be viewed as 
the main reason12 for the government’s me-
dia campaign launched in the middle of 2014, 
which was aimed at attracting more investors 
and improving the valuations of the companies 
listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock ex-
changes. There were enthusiastic articles pub-
lished in the government-controlled press, and 
the benefits of investing on the stock markets 
were praised. The regulations concerning both 
the limit of brokerage accounts per person and 
margin-lending were liberalised. All this led to 
a stock market fever across the country. What 
played the key role in the boom was the fact 
that the Chinese capital markets are still poor-
ly developed – Chinese citizens’ investing op-
portunities are largely limited to bank accounts 
offering an undervalued interest rate due to 
administrative regulations – this, of course, 
makes the stock exchange even more appeal-
ing. The factors which coincided with the stock 
market boom included the ongoing cooling 
11 http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2015/11/chinas-
stock-market-crash-part-1-communist-shares/ 
12 The Chinese government also hoped that the inflated share 
valuations would make small investors feel wealthy, and 
this would trigger consumption. The stock market also of-
fers an alternative method of financing to the ‘new econo-
my’ – innovative companies and start-ups which have very 
limited access to loans from state-controlled banks. 
of the property market and restrictions im-
posed on the operation of the shadow bank-
ing sector (both of which have previously been 
a popular tool to earn higher returns). In paral-
lel to this, the People’s Bank of China on several 
occasions lowered the required reserve ratios 
for Chinese banks, thus ensuring high liquidity 
to the financial markets. As a result, the value 
of the Chinese stock market increased in under 
12 months from June 2014 from US$3.8 trillion 
to over US$10.5 trillion13, i.e. to a value compa-
rable to China’s annual GDP.
Neither the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock ex-
changes are particularly well developed and are 
still undergoing the modernisation process. In 
a year or so, they received a vast amount of 
capital, which exacerbated the negative phe-
nomena seen there. The issues of the insuffi-
cient transparency of the companies listed on 
the Chinese stock exchanges and lower finan-
cial reporting standards than those used in de-
veloped countries, limiting the possibilities of 
analysing company value on the basis of their 
financial results, remain unresolved. The dis-
connect between share valuations and finan-
cial results is partly an effect of the predomi-
nance of SOEs on the largest stock exchanges 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen; these companies 
implementing the government’s political goals 
often disregard the interests of minority share-
holders. The instability of the stock exchanges 
also deteriorated due to corruption among the 
stock market regulators, the common practice 
of insider trading and the unrestricted flow of 
personnel between the China Securities Regu-
latory Commission (CSRC) and the firms which 




14 After the slump on the Chinese stock exchanges in the 
second half of 2015, the anticorruption campaign which 
had been launched in China a few years earlier was 
turned on the financial markets – investigations were 
launched against the senior officials of the main regula-
tor, the CSRC, the largest state-owned brokerage firms 
and some private entrepreneurs. 
Stimulating the stock market has opened up 
opportunities to reduce the debt of the SOEs 
sector, while allowing the government to re-
tain control over the economy.
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The Chinese stock market bubble was to a great 
extent driven by the commonly shared belief 
that since the Chinese leadership were so keen 
to encourage investment on the stock market, 
this would guarantee that stock prices would 
continue rising. During the stock market boom, 
investors who were building their share port-
folios on the basis of the companies’ funda-
mental value were marginalised15 to make way 
for short-term and speculative strategies which 
had nothing to do with the economic founda-
tions and which drastically increased the stock 
price volatility. This resulted in stock market 
sentiment being based on watching the gov-
ernment’s decisions and meant that the regu-
lators were trapped, with their hands tied to 
some extent while the bubble was growing16. 
The Chinese government decided to introduce 
strict controls of the stock market after a se-
ries of dramatic price falls in June 2015. This ex-
acerbated the problem of speculation and the 
stock market acting apart from the economic 
foundations, where prices were the result of 
investors’ attempts to guess the government’s 
intentions. The regulations introduced in July 
and August 2015 halted new IPOs, prevented 
15 Individual brokerage account holders, who have a rel-
atively low level of financial education, account for 
around 80% of investors on the Chinese stock market. 
16 The CSRC announced back in April 2015 that there will 
be restrictions on loans granted for the purchase of 
shares which pose a risk to the stock market. The val-
ue of these loans is now record-high, reaching US$264 
billion. Ultimately, the changes were not introduced, 
which in the opinion of some experts was linked to the 
stock market’s nervous reaction to similar decisions – in 
January 2015 this caused the Shanghai Composite index 
to fall by 7.7% during the course of one day. 
investors holding packages of less than 5% of 
shares from selling them and increased the li-
quidity in the margin-lending sector. Further-
more, a stock market stabilisation fund formed 
of state-controlled brokers was established and 
state-owned banks were prompted to invest – 
according to estimates from Goldman Sachs, 
the Chinese government pumped over US$236 
billion into the stock market within three 
months of the stock market slump in August 
201517. As a consequence of the interventions, 
stock exchanges have become dominated by 
institutions engaged in the government’s stock 
market rescue operation and speculative in-
vestors capitalising on the government’s inter-
vention. As a result, any moves from the gov-
ernment linked to the stock market at present 
cause significant share price volatility18. 
The future of reforms amid stagnation 
on the stock market
The reform of SOEs launched in 2013 has lost its 
initial momentum partly due to pressure from 
interest groups linked to SOEs and the conser-
vative factions inside the Communist Party of 
China. In the present situation, the operation to 
sell off part of state-owned assets on the stock 
market has been limited to a significant extent, 
and this calls into question the main channel 
for the implementation of the mixed owner-
ship reform. What is more, the volatility on the 
Chinese stock exchanges have brought about 
a partial regression of the reform – at a criti-
cal moment the government convinced part of 
the SOEs to buy back their own shares to save 




18 For example, the significant price falls at the beginning 
of January 2016 were mainly caused by the expected lift-
ing of the ban on large investors selling shares, which 
had been planned for 8 January (and which was, as a re-
sult, postponed) and the inept introduction (and speedy 
cancellation) of the mechanism suspending trading in 
case CSI 300 index falls by more than 7%. 
The government’s interventions on the 
stock market have made investors’ sen-
timents dependent on the government’s 
moves, limiting the possibilities of making 
a rapid reaction to the growing specula-
tive bubble.
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further restructuring and obtaining capital on 
the stock market are also limited. Although the 
introduction of new companies to the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges was resumed in 
late November/early December 2015, as com-
pared to the beginning of last year, the num-
ber of IPOs has fallen, the valuations are much 
lower and decisions to issue larger quantities 
of shares by SOEs cause uncertainty among in-
vestors. This has left the Chinese government 
facing a dilemma – in their desire to return op-
timism to the stock market it has promised to 
further enhance the reforms of SOEs (for exam-
ple by increasing their presence on the stock 
market) but on the other hand it has offered 
assurances that this process will take some time 
so as to avoid sudden share price fluctuation19. 
Bringing back the reform to the initial track will 
thus depend on whether market mechanisms 
will be reinstated to the stock market and 
whether the confidence of investors searching 
for value, both domestic and foreign, will be re-
gained. This requires a thorough reform on the 
Chinese stock market, cracking down on abuse, 
better protection of investors, and a long-term 
plan for educating individual investors. 
Since investors’ eyes are now turned towards 
the governmental financial market regula-
tors, it is essential that the regulators provide 
the market with adequate communication of 
their intentions. The serious problems which 
currently exist include: the non-transparent 
distribution of competences, and the lack of 
19 This is the tone of the official narrative accompanying 
the publication of the plan to enhance the mixed own-
ership reform of September 2015: http://www.global-
times.cn/content/942229.shtml 
communication between financial market reg-
ulators. One result is that the institutions give 
contradictory messages. In effect, at the begin-
ning of 2016, the Chinese leadership promised 
to establish a special commission for financial 
market reform whose members will include 
the central bank and the main regulator of the 
stock market. However, the situation remains 
somewhat opaque for the markets, especially 
given the fact that ever more competences are 
being vested in the informal group of advisors 
to President Xi Jinping.
In the opinion of most experts, the Chinese 
government still has the financial capacity to 
stabilise the capital markets – what may help it 
in this is the fact that the central government’s 
debt to GDP ratio is relatively low (it 41% in 
2014), and also the fact that the liquidity and 
profitability of state-owned banks is very high. 
The government is able to buy the time re-
quired to carry out the capital market reforms; 
however, these cannot be put off forever. Fur-
thermore, there is a significantly increased risk 
in the financial system caused by the involve-
ment of state-controlled banks in providing 
loans for unprofitable companies, restructuring 
the local governments’ debt and supporting 
the stock market. On the other hand, the poor-
ly developed capital market creates the risk that 
more speculative bubbles will emerge – the first 
symptoms of this have already been observed, 
for example, on the Chinese corporate bonds 
market20, and on the real estate market in the 
largest cities. The key problem of companies’ 
increasing indebtedness remains unresolved 
– according to Chinese statistics, the value of 
the loans granted to non-financial entities is 
growing by more than 14% annually, this is 
more than double that of the officially estimat-
ed GDP growth. Given the limited possibilities 
to reduce the debts of the SOEs sector, the sce-




The capital market reform is among the 
major challenges the Chinese leadership 
is facing – the Chinese financial system’s 
stability depends on it.
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entities seems ever more likely, even though 
the government has been trying to prevent 
this scenario due to the expected social costs. 
Proof that this process has begun include: the 
reduction of employment levels by 15% in the 
steel and coal industry announced in March 
201621; and the announcement in the annu-
al report from Li Keqiang’s government that 
‘zombie firms’ and part of the centrally man-
aged companies will be wound up.
21 More than 1.8 million jobs are at stake: http://www.
reuters .com/ar t ic le /us- china-economy-employ-
ment-idUSKCN0W205X
